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Journey to the End of the Night:




Limon, Professor  
of
 
English at Williams  
College, is
 
the author of  
Writing After War:
 American War Fic
­tion From Realism to
 Postmodernism
 (Oxford UP, 1994)
 and is currently writ
­ing essays on stand-up
 comedy, beginning






David Letterman is baffled and balked by intellec
­
tion; he is heaped by 
it.
 Wherever it manifests itself,  
he is awe-stricken. Like most Americans, he is  
unsure where to locate it — Ted 
Koppel
 is his idea of  
an intellectual1 — but wherever he finds it, he is
 unmoored to the point
 
of hysteria. Disconcerted,  but  
freed of his inhibitions by her unwittiness, he bel
­lowed at Marilyn vos Savant: "I'm as smart as you!”
David Letterman thinks as quickly as anybody in
 
America — as fast as William F. Buckley,
 
Jr., in one  
field, or Stanley Fish, in another. The conundrum
 that he seems to confront every day is how it is pos
­sible to think dangerously fast yet
 
possess no ideas at  
all. His condition
 
is the intellectual equivalent of pri ­
apism among mannequins. It seems to make him
 furious.
It makes him, also, the
 
best comedian of his time,  
since jokes are successful to the extent that they
 impose the form of
 
thought on disarray. Therefore  
Letterman s jokes are, disproportionately, meta-jokes;
 they are about the formal intelligence with only dreck
 for substance.
Female Intelligence




 of mind, is a particular type of female  
1
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intelligence, as manifest 
in
 such personages as Jane Pauley, Ellen DeGeneres, or  
Teri 
Garr.
 He told an interviewer that “there is something very appealing about  
smart women, intelligent women. And you can see the problem there: if
 they’re smart enough for me to be interested, then they’re not going to have
 anything to do with me” (Zehne 101).
Letterman is apt to refer
 
to such women as “witty.” By this,  I think he intu ­
its the following. Pure comedy is Euclidean form imposed on debris. Insofar
 as the shape of humor is congruent with its material, on the other hand, it is
 classified as wit. Of course, neither Pauley nor DeGeneres nor Garr is exactly
 an aphorist along the lines of La Rochefoucauld or Wilde. What gives their
 humor an unexpected integrity is gender: their femaleness is both the sub
­stance and shape of their humor. Letterman cannot fathom this, but he adores
 it.
Speed
In his purity, in what I wish to call his 
abject
 purity, Letterman can seem like a  
disembodied intelligence. Women on his show may fawn on him, but when
 they do, Letterman is often repelled — any Letterman theory would have to
 begin with the national 
seductiveness
 of his encircled, beleaguered, castellated  
comic mind. We hear that he watches his weight to the point of 
anorexia
 (on  
a show he said he was 
6
’2”, 170 lbs.); a study of the jaws f afflicted Americans  
would force the conclusion that anorexia is the last wilderness of American
 Puritanism, where 
will
 nourishes itself on its own negation, where self-abase ­
ment is the only
 
licit form of self-fashioning,  where heroic bleeding is the only  
sanctioned form of heroism. On “Good Morning, America,”2 after his Acade
­my Awards show failure, Letterman said that you learn by “ingesting the neg
­ative,” which is unintentionally a bulimarexic pun (the negative once ingested,
 Letterman’s most negative emissions are in jest).
You can conceive of Letterman almost as pure velocity. A really great
 
comedian has a demented time sense: the world appears to be moving too
 slowly for 
his
 mind. (For a great comic actor, it may be moving too fast.) To  
the extent that time is psychological, a comedian is forced to live in concentric
 spheres, 
revolving
 at different rates. The scraping throws off sparks, but it  
makes Letterman crazy. The effort to put the two worlds in gear may involve
 alcohol or drugs; for Letterman, it entails speeding.
“To annihilate both space and time” was the hype of American Protestant
 
technological millenarianism. The dream of pure soul — or
 
pure mind —  is, at  
its most intense, to be everywhere at once. The mode of American apocalypse
 proceeded from train to telegraph (the increase in speed was a progressive ani
­mation) naturally to TV. TV apocalypse is the American style of abjection.
Car-son
The paradox is that Letterman is the loudest American comedian since Sid
 
Caesar. He yells an astounding fraction of his jokes, with a leonine roar like the
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start of an engine, as if his first Indiana jokes had to outshout the whole Indi
­
anapolis 500. He is also oddly physical: he does facial shtick (the skunk eye,
 for example); he plays with his suit; he imposes his body even as far as the cam
­era.
Yet all the time you feel that there is a mind at the center of all this physi
­
cal demonstration, driving it like a machine, 
like
 a car, trying to call itself into  
the world as the car. The great Protestant comedians turn jokes into violent,
 swift, efficient, beautiful mechanisms. Johnny Carson was Lettermans prede
­cessor in this pursuit, securing a kind of rock-age technical perfectionism from
 the jazzy improvisations of his Jewish coequals, Mel Brooks, Buddy Hackett, or
 Lenny Bruce. Carsons mind would plant itself within costumes; costumes
 would mortify Letterman; but Lettermans suit and his body
 
itself, and his face  
itself, are contraptions, like Walt Disney’s automated Presidents on steroids.
Letterman’s height does matter. You feel slightly disoriented and depressed
 
when his guest is taller than he is. But I read Letterman’s height, as I shall
 argue with respect to a peculiar moment in Céline, as pure verticality, a single
 ideal dimension.
Lettermania
Almost everyone is willing, in Letterman’s presence, to play at abjection: his
 
audience grovels in order to be part of the 
show
 and sensibility. They submit  
to his thinking of them as his “kids.” Yet when
 
you observe him in the compa ­
ny of those he respects — Pauley or DeGeneres or Garr (who, like mothers, are
 adored and unattainable by tacit consent) and Carson (among fathers) — you
 fantasize a similar familiarity,
 
by which  I mean that he could be, with  you, sim ­
ilarly 
abject.
 The Letterman anecdote that any essay on him has to repeat con ­
cerns the note he passed to Teri Garr before a commercial: “I hate myself.”
 With respect to Carson, the abjection is more balanced (you are not supposed to
 be the man your father was): “That’s the guy. Maybe I could work at it, but
 I’m not the guy.”3
The
 
TV relationship, which the Academy Awards audience resisted, is not  
a meeting of 
subjects
 and objects, as at the movies, but an intimacy of abjects.4  
David Letterman 
makes
 our abjection visible —  he puts it before the camera —  
but visible in a twice-disowned body, once 
by
 self-disjunction, twice by the  
technologies of fame; and a corollary
 
is that exposure to the dreck of New York  
that Letterman loves to dwell on and in leaves us feeling almost absolved. The







There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being,
 
directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside 
or
3





ejected beyond  the scope of the  possible,  the tolerable, the thinkable. It  
lies there, quite close, but 
it
 cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and  
fascinates desire, which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. Appre
­hensive, desire turns aside; sickened,
 
it rejects. A  certainty protects  it from the  
shameful a certainty of which 
it
 is proud holds on to it. But simultaneous ­
ly, 
just
 the same, that impetus, that spasm, that leap is drawn toward an else ­
where as tempting as it is condemned. Unflaggingly, like an inescapable
 boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsion places the one haunted by it
 literally beside himself. (Kristeva 1)
So
 
begins Kristeva 's “Essay on Abjection,” and I believe it is, so to speak, empir ­
ically correct. However you take Kristeva
'
s neo-Freudian etiology (“abjection”  
is a reminiscence of the condition of the subject, unseparated from the mater
­nal body, before it is a subject, the adult 
affect
 of which is horror of the indis ­
crete), it is certain that she knows how abjection is 
experienced.
 It is experi ­
enced, first of all, as a 
negative
 ecstasy — you are “literally” beside yourself; it  
may be summarized as your failure to know what is inside of what, to find your  
own synecdoche, the homunculus that stands for self. This entails a series of
 incongruities.
(1) “Abjection,” whose posture ought to be prostrate, is capable of resis
­
tance, of “revolt,” 
in
 fact. (2) Revolt leads to resistance (or else the revolt is the  
resistance — it is characteristically unclear), which is not
 
to desire, it is of desire.  
This is understandable enough, except that desire's willfulness and uprightness
 seem oddly (for desire) Puritanical. (3) If desire acts like restraint, the object
 of abjection — the “abject,” as Kristeva calls it — must resemble, at any rate,
 the object of desire; 
one
 is summoned by it. Desire is pseudo-conscience  
because abjection is pseudo-desire. (4) If desire acts like restraint, it can 
be
 a  
source of self-pride. But instead of “it [desire] holds on to a certainty
 
of which  
it is proud,” we get, “a certainty of which it [desire] is proud holds 
on
 to it.”  
Desire feels, somehow, as if its power to resist comes from elsewhere; yet the
 feeling of self-disenfranchisement must be exactly what, in abjection, desire is
 resisting. If abjection is pseudo-desire, desire plays the role of conscience
 abjectly.
This flux of 
will
 and victimage — such that what is tempting is not  desired,  
and desire in turn restrains, and desire in turn is proudly held — seems to me
 exactly apt as as a social diagnosis of Puritanism (only in the presence of
 
the  
abject will desire convert itself into conscience, surviving by self-betrayal). Yet
 it is safe to say that Kristeva is not the theorist to appreciate the comic
 
possibil ­
ities of deriving uprightness from prostration.
Abject Histrionics
The person who is “beset by abjection” (Kristeva 1) puts on, I should think,
 
dail
y infra-dramas, actor before audience and vice versa. You are, after all, lit ­
erally beside yourself, watching your faculties — desire, for example — play
 unaccustomed roles, always authored by someone else. Kristeva, however, does
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not quite say this. Her abjected subject is caught in a vortex, is haunted; even
 
its power to resist is merely susceptibility to sickness and repulsion; it is much
 more acted upon than active. Nowhere before her culminating section on
 Céline does Kristeva focus precisely enough 
on
 the histrionic aspect of abjec­
tion; and in the Céline passages, I think, she does not contemplate it so much




“Abjection” has, in English, an uncollapsible performative dimension. All
 of what follows is listed in one dictionary as a single meaning of the term
 “abject.” “Sunk to a low condition; cast 
down
 in spirit or hope; degraded;  
servile; groveling; despicable; as abject posture, fortune, thoughts; 
base
 and  
abject flatterers.” The oddness is how this meaning silently turns at “servile”;
 and how the theatrical dimension of the second example (“abject flatterers”) is
 already ambiguously present
 
in the first (“base and abject flatterers” will assume  
an “abject posture”); and how the apparent redundancy of adjectives in the sec
­ond example (“
base
 and abject”) fudges the question of whether at the root of  
abject performance is abject being.
The term “abjection” itself is falsely, therefore appropriately, Latinate and
 
upright. This would be telling if everyone who was abject was aware that he or
 she was “abject” — which may be the case, for all I know. There may be no
 abjection without a frustrated definitional literacy. At any rate, all those who
 identify themselves as abject, for example Céline, 
wil
l feel the telltale self ­
dramatization of the word. Even if we posit a victim of abjection who is psy
­chologically illiterate, nevertheless it 
may 
be a symptom of the ego at the edge  
of its defenses, scouting for even a counterproductive self-definition, that any
 extreme state will be enacted with hostility and lobbed like a grenade to the
 back row.
Comic Abjection
Not sufficiently registering the histrionic assertiveness of 
abjection
 is not suffi­
ciently featuring, I want to argue, the essentially
 
comic dimension of abjection.
Abjection and Laughter in Kristeva
Laughter ought to have more to do with Kristevas nosography. There are
 
moments when its exclusion seems almost perverse. Following her initial asso
­ciation of the abject with unthinkable permeabilities, Kristeva specifies vague
­ly, defines abjectly, that it is a “'something that I 
do
 not recognize as a thing.  
A weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and
 which crushes me” (2). If it crushes her, it cannot be taken lightly; yet the pres
­ence of significance without meaning seems comic in general, and like David
 Letterman's comedy 
in
 particular. Its symptom is verbal speed: “The speech of  
the phobic adult is also characterized by extreme nimbleness. But that vertig
­inous skill
 
is as if void of meaning, traveling  at top speed over an untouched and  
untouchable abyss, of which, on 
occasion,
 only the affect shows up, giving not  
5
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a sign but a signal” (41). Here the crushing weight of meaninglessness seems
 
to take the form of levity; surely 
in
 Kristeva’s oxymoron we are approaching  
laughter: “But with the borderline patient, sense does not emerge out of non
­sense, metaphorical or witty
 
though it might  be” (50). Not quite there, howev ­
er. “On the contrary, non-sense runs through signs and sense, 
and
 the result ­
ing manipulation of words is not intellectual play but, without any laughter, a
 desperate attempt to hold on to the ultimate obstacles of a pure signfier that has
 been abandoned by the paternal metaphor” (50-1).
Occasionally one is sure that, for Kristeva, it is simply the case that laugh
­
ter palliates the abject condition. Discussing Dostoevsky’s The Possessed, Kris
­teva asserts that “Verkhovensky
 
is abject because of his clammy, cunning appeal  
to ideals that no longer exist, from the moment when Prohibition (call it God)
 is lacking. Stavrogin is perhaps less so, for 
his
 immoralism admits of laughter  
and refusal” (19). This would appear to set up a disjunction: abjection or
 laughter. Yet when Kristeva goes on to describe the modern world, what she
 finds is abjection and laughter undivided: “The worlds of illusions, now dead
 and buried, have given way to our dreams and deliriums if not to politics or sci
­
ence
 — the religions of modern times. Lacking illusions, lacking shelter,  
today’s universe is divided between boredom (increasingly anguished at the
 prospect of losing its resources, through depletion) 
or
 (when the spark of the  
symbolic is maintained and desire to 
speak
 explodes) abjection and piercing  
laughter" (133).
Which is it: or
 
or and? Laughter would seem to be an ambiguity  within a  
confusion. But there is a way to be more precise about the relationship. When
 Kristeva defines sin as “subjectified abjection” (128), you might feel inspired to
 refer to laughter as “objectified abjection.” 
Kristeva
 finds abjection unfunny  
when signifiers have been “abandoned
 
by  the paternal metaphor,” when “Prohi ­
bition (call it God) is lacking,” but piercingly funny “when the spark of the
 symbolic is maintained,” which 
may
 be  the difference  between an enervated and  
an electrified absence. Absent objectivity is funny when it “sparks,” perhaps,
 because a joke is dreck enflamed by form, that is, by a standard it inhabits but
 to which it cannot aspire. Thus it 
becomes
 clear why laughter, disjoined from  
abjection generally, attaches to it when 
Kristeva
 comes to describe modernity:  
in our century, apocalyptic yet Godless, abjection is a psychopathology that
 happens to 
be
 realistic. When you cannot abject your abjection, according to  
Kristeva, as filth or sin (the God of Jews and Christians alike being dead) —
 when objectivity lingers in the world only as a 
measure
 of abjectivity — you  
laugh.
This move allows Kristeva to value Céline without embracing him: an
 
abject person may show a symptom, but in an abject world, a person 
may
 be a  
symptom.5 But I still do not think that Kristeva — by positing that Céline’s
 laughter makes him a symptom of an objectively abjectifying world
 
— has got ­
ten his humor exactly right. She arrives at
 
the topic at long last in the brief cul ­
minating section on Céline.
With Céline we are elsewhere. As in 
apocalyptic
 or even prophetic utter ­
ances, he speaks out on horror. But while the former can be withstood
 because of a distance that allows for judging, lamenting, condemning,
6
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Céline — who speaks from within — has no threats to utter, no morality
 
to  
defend. In the name of what would he do it? So his laughter bursts out,
 facing abjection, and always originating at the same source, of which Freud
 had caught a 
glimpse:
 the gushing forth of the unconscious, the repressed,  
suppressed pleasure, be it sex or death. (205-6)
Céline is 
an
 apocalyptic writer without revelations; his "language of abjec­
tion” merely “topples” into “nothing
 
more than the effervescence of passion and  
language 
we
 call style” (206). The unconscious gushes; the laughter bursts; the  
language topples; Céline is overwhelmed. The paradoxical willfulness of abjec
­tion drops out: some have degradedness thrust upon them. Yet even Kristeva’s
 Céline is capable of knowing that abjection 
may
 be histrionic. The two Hen-  
rouilles women in Journey t  the End of the  Night, which should have been the  
name of the David Letterman show, embody in Kristeva’s phrase “calculated
 abjection” (168). It does not gush, burst, or topple: it manipulates and maneu
­vers. Abjection may be a recrudescence of the pre-mirror stage, but it practices
 before a portable 
mirror.
 (Kristeva implies at various points the relation of  
abjection to anorexia — food is feces in the abject ethos — but the gagging
 nausea she describes is not the anorexic’s willful self-sculpting.)
Céline
What is funny about Journey to the End of the Night?6 Partly its humor resides
 
in local excesses; but the greater, antithetical joke is Journeys refusal to ascend
 or decline: its perfect horizontality. You feel mounting hysteria (under partic
­ular circumstances, a condition confusable with hilarity) from the book’s failure
 to ascend or decline with you. In the first place, Bardamu seems to 
preserve just enough innocence
 
—just enough vulnerability to goodness  — to keep hor ­
ror fresh, from World War I to Africa
 
to New York to Detroit to the insane asy ­
lum back in France and 
his
 own old age. But even the uniformity of that  move­
ment — in
 
which goodness is a blip — is not constant  enough. Bardamu’s hor ­
ror is always ready and prepared; it 
precedes
 existence. Even before the Great  
War, a
 
young Bardamu describes God as “sensual” and  “grunt[ing] like a pig. A  
pig with golden wings, who falls and falls, always belly side up, ready for caress
­es, that’s him, our master” (Journey 1983, 4). This God is a bourgeois even
 before Bardamu has the experience of impoverished resentment. Bardamu
 knows him 
by
 inverse empathy, because his own destiny is to fall and fall, belly  
side up, ready for abjection.
“You can 
be
 a virgin in horror,” Céline or Bardamu notoriously proclaims,  
“the same as in sex” (Journey 1983, 9). As a matter of 
fact,
 one is never, in Jour ­
ney to the End of the
 
Night, a virgin in horror, if that means unacquainted with  
it. I call attention to the possibility that one may be “innocent ... of Horror”  
(Marks’s translation \Journey 1934, 9] of “on est puceau 
de
 l’Horreur” [Voyage  
21]), nonetheless: the point is that something in Céline takes the place of inno
­cence, that is, the place before experience. Whatever that something is, it must
 have the following skewed characteristics. It must precede experience (so that
7
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the experience of horror is definite); it must figure experience proleptically (so
 
that Bardamu can recognize horror as the correlative of what horrified him even
 before 
he
 encountered it in World War I); it must continue during experience  
(so that horrors, anticipated and never-ending, 
will
 nevertheless stay fresh).7
The trivial American name for that thing is "attitude,” as when Jerry Sein
­feld says that David Letterman “has a great attitude.” The humor of attitude is
 that it judges all the time but is strictly non-judgmental; it is not, as Kristeva
 says, apocalyptic or prophetic, insofar as there is no experience that precedes it
 to judge; and when experience does accrue, it is powerless to make a case,
 mocked by its own superfluity. The same attitude greets every eventuality. This
 is 
significance
 without meaning, intelligence  without ideas: attitude is a way to  
be of the world but not in
 it.
 Starting with attitude means that there is nowhere  
for a journey
 
to get. Bardamu arrives at horror  immediately, and spends the rest  
of his journey — undertaken on the assumption that there
 
is an end to the night  
— rediscovering it, until the peripatetic immobility abruptly shuts down.
Céline says brilliantly that “one has to be more than somewhat dead in
 
order to be truly a wisecracker!” (quoted in Kristeva 138). Death is, technical
­ly, infinite repetition without intervals, which makes Bardamu’s travels an
 approximation of an after-death experience in continuous disgust. What is the
 humor of this? How would The Divine Comedy be comedic if there 
were
 only  
Inferno? Invoking the trite term “attitude” is only meant to call attention to a
 quality of Journeys abjection: its chronic inexperience. The novel may be
 described as a monologue that occasionally intersects not experience or other
 humans but other monologues. When Bardamu, in the first chapter, describes
 God as a pig, he is performing at the time his poem on the subject, before the
 history that can only justify 
it. And wherever Bardamu's monologue crosses another, there abject histrion
­ics cross. The monologue is the privileged technique of attitude: it comes first,
 but it confines reality such that nothing else comes second. And attitude is
 abjection on a roll, abjection exuberant in its basic exhibitionism. Tania, a
 woman whose beloved has just died, is “intent on her tragedy, and still more
 intent on exhibiting it
 
to me in full flood” (Journey 1983, 315). In this respect, 
she resembles the 
newly
 blinded Robinson, who “groaned under his bandages  
as soon as he heard me climbing the stairs” (Journey 1983, 281). It is impor
­tant to locate the performativity within abjection, not outside it and compro
­mising it. Robinson is in fact abject — recumbent — but 
he
 is also perform ­
ing abjection. “People live from one play to the next,” Bardamu says, always
 ready with the aphorism that is his own emblematic performance {Journey
 1983, 224). Thus a “tragedy” such as Tania
'
s feeds comedies such as Céline 's.
When Bardamu arrives at New York, he shares a laugh — unique experi
­ence, since most communal laughter in this book is of a piece with horror,
 merely smut amid smuttiness —
 
with his fellow voyagers.
Talk of
 
surprises! What we suddenly discovered through the fog was  
so amazing
 
that at first we refused to believe it,  but  then, when we were face  
to face with it, galley slaves or not, we couldn’t
 
help laughing, seeing it right  
there in front of us. . . .
8
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Just imagine, that city was standing absolutely erect. New York was a
 
standing city. Of course we’d seen cities, fine ones too, and magnificent
 seaports. But in our part of
 
the world cities lie along the seacoast or on  
rivers, they
 
recline on the landscape, awaiting the traveler, while this Amer ­
ican city had nothing languid about her, she stood there as stiff as a board,
 not seductive at all, terrifyingly stiff.
We laughed like fools. You can’t help laughing at a city built straight
 
up and down like that. But we 
could
 only laugh from the neck  up, because  
of the cold blowing in from the sea through a gray and pink mist, a brisk
 sharp wind that attacked our pants and the chinks in that wall, I mean the
 city streets, which engulfed the wind-borne clouds. (Journey 1983, 159;
 Céline’s ellipsis)
This is a peculiar passage: not only does Bardamu — uncharacteristically
 
socialized — share a
 
laugh, but the  laugh goes on and on; it is a unique moment  




an obvious smutty joke. The city is erect in public;  it is an urban  
exhibitionist. Or say that the
 
joke is trickier than that, because the European  
cities that "recline on the landscape, awaiting the traveler” would seem to be
 female (though immobile and inorganic as mannequins), making the grammar
 of the translation appropriate, even if its biology
 
is not: “she stood there as stiff  
as a board, not 
seductive
 at all.” If the woman repossesses the phallus, will this  
be perceived as comical? But the joke is only half-funny, only funny “from the
 neck up,” 
because
 the “sharp” wind “attacked our pants.” Castration is not  
funny when it can be felt; it is only funny insofar as the head can be separated,
 for the sake of intellectual amusement, from the body that suffers it. This sep
­aration, of course, is not merely a retreat to the intellectual; it is a retreat from
 castration to the intellectual by means of an 
act
 of self-castration. The joke  
here would seem to 
be
 the proud reenactment of castration in order to escape  
it.
I am not quite satisfied with this exegesis, 
because
 the European cities that  
lie down assume the abject posture, which is a position normally assumed, in
 Kristeva and Céline, 
by
 men. I do not think that Bardamu is laughing at a  
phallic woman so much as at a phallic abjection: the wind attacks both the voy
­agers’ pants and the permeability of the wall. This makes the femaleness of
 cities into a metaphor of the abjection of the men who inhabit them, enslaved.
 So the joke is not the sort of smut that Bardamu scorns; it reveals the point of
 that smut.
When Bardamu goes ashore, he walks down Broadway — in three of the
 
sensible four dimensions he walks by the Ed Sullivan Theater, where David
 Letterman performs. On Broadway, the truth of New York reveals itself to 
be horizontal after all: “That street was like a dismal gash, endless, with us at the
 bottom of it, filling it from side to side, advancing from sorrow to sorrow,
 toward an end that is never in sight, the end of all the streets 
in
 the world”  
(Journey 1983, 166). Broadway, for all the castrated disgust of this passage —
 
we
 are imagined less as castrated than as the blood of an objectified castration  
— has the precise, endless automobility of Céline’s novel. The castration, so
9
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long as it is objective, is still funny. New
 
York is always the land of the joke in  
Céline: below ground, where men excrete,
 
they “laughed and joked and cheered  
one another on”; “the new arrivals were assailed with a thousand revolting
 jokes” Journey 1983, 169). But this is the sort of smutty joking that Bardamu
 despises, as opposed to the real humor of the vertical. New York is the inter
­section of perpendicular hilarities.
One of the few
 
uses of the term “abject”  in Journey (at least according  to the  
Marks translation) is in the description of blinded, criminal Robinson who “lay
 in . . . bed upstairs 
in
 an abject state of  mind” Journey 1934, 322; “Lui, dans  
leur lit de la chambre d’en haut menait pas large” [Voyage
 
290]). Yet this is only  
a page before we are told that Robinson “groaned under his bandages as soon
 as he heard me climbing the stairs.” Abjectness is proneness seeking an audi
­ence. Whenever there is 
abjectness,
 there is performance; whenever abjectness  
is exposed as exhibition, it is comic. It is comic because it should be prone but
 it is upright. “I was a hundred-percent sick,” says Bardamu, “I felt as if I had
 no further use for my legs, they just hung over the edge of my bed like unim
­portant and rather ridiculous objects” Journey 1983, 148; “commes des choses
 négligeables et un peu comiques” [Voyage 158]). What is comic is that the
 essence of verticality should make itself visible as the sign of a complete hori
­zontal impotence.
Napoleon said that a heroic 
speech
 would become comic if the orator sat 
down while orating. Céline implies the inverse: the 
abject 
monologue becomes  
comic when it stands up. David Letterman, stranger in New York, caffeinated
 when he should 
be
 sleepy, vertical when he should be supine, panning New  
York from the Empire State Building down, is the stand-up comedian par
 excellence. The gestalt
 
of talk show stand-up realizes the implicit  added dimen ­
sion: Letterman is vertical when we are prostrate, but we take his attitude as
 our own. All Americans are now funny, not just Jewish comedians and gag
 writers straining 
for
 weekly material. (The average gag on the worst situation  
comedies now is funnier, judged in isolation, than the best gag on, say, The Hon-
 eymooners\ and the terrorized look on Groucho’s contestants has faded from the
 face of the earth.) This eventuality — the comedification of America
 
— is the  
most astounding fact about the American sensibility from 1960 to 1996.
 Where Bardamu meets America — in the New York illuminated night, on
 Broadway, at the Ed Sullivan Theater — is the stage on which, at the millen
­nial end of his century, its abjection erects its last cross.
3.
 
The King of Comedy
What is the fate of
 
abjection in Martin Scorseses scarily intelligent film, The  
King of Comedy? It ought to be everywhere in the film, but seems to be
 nowhere. The pathetic comedian Rupert Pupkin (Robert DeNiro) should be
 abject but is utterly buoyant, directed, and simple in his psychosis. He knows
 where to seek the end of his night. Talk show superhost Jerry Langford (Jerry
 Lewis) should be symmetrically abject — if I have justified applying the term
 to David Letterman — but shows few signs of having any of the requisite
 boundaries whose permeability would
 
horrify him. A first approximation of the  
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psychocomic situation is that neither has abjection because they have 
each 
other. Rupert Pupkin begins the movie in 
an
 exact copy of Jerry Langfords  
suit, and Jerry Langford ends the movie staring at multiple images, in multiple
 TVs, of Rupert Pupkin. When Rupert looks at Jerry, 
he
 sees his own body  
thrown off and replaced by
 an
 image, out  of all time and space; when Jerry looks  
at Pupkin, he sees at a distance 
his
 own rejected body, rejected identity, reject ­
ed home.




 host of The Tonight Show and Rupert Pupkin the pretend host, yet the  
film gives Jerry Lewis the opportunity to pretend to 
be
 Johnny Carson (and  
along the way gives Tony Randall,
 
playing “himself,” the opportunity to pretend  
to be Jerry Langford). What does it mean to conclude that
 
Jerry Lewis is to  
Johnny Carson as Rupert Pupkin is to Jerry Langford? It is almost precisely
 true to say that what Jerry Lewis gets to pretend to be is Protestant. When I
 first saw The King of Comedy, my initial reaction was: but
 
dont  they understand  
that Jerry Lewis cannot under any circumstances be the Tonight Show host? Its
 host must be a pseudo-hick with attitude arriving in New York from the heart
­land; he meets Jewishness there, and the chiasmus (stranger host from the
 provinces meets native guest from the home city) is the genius of the genre. He
 cannot 
be
 a Jew himself: one has only a distant memory of the ill-conceived  
Joey
 
Bishop Show, whose only upshot  was the subsequent glory of Joey 's second  
banana, Regis Philbin.
My second reaction, however, is that the fate of Jerry
 
Langford’s Jewishness  
is the fate of his abjection. Not that Jewishness is the royal road to abjection
 — rather that Jerry Langford’s own body is treated like pork in his desire for
 pure imagery. Jerry is installed, in The King of Comedy, in layers and corridors
 of Waspitude (played by Shelley Hack); like the heart of the Pentagon, he is
 protected from invasion not 
by
 locked doors or impregnable  walls but rather by  
an aseptic 
maze.
 At his network office, or at his penthouse, or at his country  
home, Langford’s life is a Nordic iceberg.
But when Pupkin penetrates Langford’s country home, Jewishness reap
­
pears, though it is entirely unclear where. The Asian butler,
 
Jonno, summons  
Langford home from his golf game, exclaiming over the phone, “I’m getting a
 heart attack, already.” For the moment, only the
 
Asian is a Jew. Yet when Jerry  
arrives on the scene,
 
he manages to be, for perhaps the only moment of the film,  
expressively Jewish 
himself.
 Jerry kicks Rupert out of the house; making the  
pathetically tardy inference that Jerry (at a previous encounter) had only
 feigned kindness, Rupert says, belligerently, “So I made a mistake.” “So did
 Hitler,” Jerry counters. This riposte, I believe, could not have been in the script
 — it makes too little sense. It has all the 
marks
 of what passes in Jerry Lewis’s  
ind for a witticism: it is cruel, sharp, and fast, it has the form of a joke, but
 it has no humor. Does Jerry Lewis (or Jerry Langford) forget at the moment
 who is in power? What mistake of Hitler’s is he thinking of? All that is clear
 is that something that has been repressed returns: what Jerry Langford expels,
 Jerry Lewis ingests. This is a moment of abject reversibility, only possible if
 abjection is the sort of rotatable axis I have described. Céline claims to be the
 true victim of World War II, and Heller and Roth (and the Jewish comedians
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Meanwhile, Rupert (along with his accomplice, Masha, played by Sandra
 
Bernhard) resolutely distances himself from all the New York nobodies and cra
­zies with whom he manifestly
 
has everything in common. As opposed to Jerry,  
who in this film is 
never
 anywhere in particular, Rupert is always somewhere. 
His comedy routine returns compulsively to his place of origin, Clifton, New
 Jersey; so does Rupert, who still lives in his mothers house. But Rupert has an
 insight: in the world of the media, other people may carry your body for you,
 
like
 your golf clubs.
What Rupert does to Jerry is give him a body and a
 
place. In Rupert's aura,  
Jerry’s body turns out to
 
be bizarrely locatable, his world  bizarrely pregnable. In  
Rupert, at long last, Jerry must ruminate on what he has ejected. Rupert and
 Masha capture Jerry, sit him down, mummify 
his
 body; for one night he is i  
one home, not every home. When
 
Jerry is ensconced in tape, the film cuts to  
the network office where Rupert’s blackmail offer (in return for Jerry’s body, he
 is to be allowed
 
to appear  on The Jerry Langford Show) is being discussed: “Sup ­
pose we tape him,” somebody says, meaning,
 
“suppose we agree to videotape the  
show with Rupert before committing ourselves to broadcasting it.” The pun is  
really an anti-pun: tape locates Jerry in 
one
 chair and one body but displaces  
Rupert from his image. When the tape is, in fact, aired, Rupert stands proud
­ly beside his own face; Jerry is looking at
 
many identical  images in a department  
store window; then Rupert’s face begins to multiply across hundreds of copies
 of Life, Newsweek, Rolling Stone, and People, Mechanical reproduction is
 squared idealism: a machine is intelligence without content, insofar as it dis
­embodies and dislocates on behalf of no value.
In fame America, you can lose your body (in images), your voice (when
 
Jerry Langford phones the office and says that he is being held hostage, it is
 assumed that 
an
 impressionist is staging a gag), and your name (the movie  
begins with a distribution of autographs, some of them pseudonyms). Here is
 the logic of abjection taken to its grandest joke: at the end of the night, when
 
we
 are on the verge of sleep, when our bodies seem so massive that sleeping  
itself seems an unfair burden, David Letterman conspires with Jerry Langford
 to stand up for velocity and lightness of being — all intelligence, no meaning.
 The dream is of a world that makes a joke of class, ethnicity, origins — of all
 situations. The American joke, 1960-1996 — which should not be thought
­lessly dismissed as a joke — is that, faced with the alienation of body, voice, and





The Family Feud audience was asked in the early 1980s to “name an  
intellectual.” The winners of the poll were Henry Kissinger,
 
William Buckley,  






I am not sure how everyone is in possession of the first anecdote; for the  
remark about Carson, see Schruers 32.
4.
 
From Frankfurt to Birmingham, TV criticism has increasingly propped  
up its object, the TV audience. First proclaimed to be absorbed and catatonic,
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then peripatetic and distracted, the TV audience is now conceived of as inter
­
active and contumacious. For variations on the Birmingham view see Hall et
 al.; Fiske and Hartley; and Press. The point of my own essay is to explain how
 the TV audience as well as the TV star can be symmetrically and simultane
­ously absorbed, peripatetic, and interactive.
5.
 
For Céline as symptom in Kristeva, see Hill.
6.
 
Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Voyage au Bout de la Nuit, references to this edi ­
tion, abbreviated Voyage, will be inserted parenthetically 
in
 the text. All trans ­
lations, unless otherwise stated, are from the Manheim translation; references
 to this edition, abbreviated Journey 1983, will 
be
 inserted parenthetically  in the  
text. Occasional reference is made to Marks’s translation; references to this edi
­tion, abbreviated Journey 1934, 
will
 be inserted parenthetically in the text.
7.
 
See the special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly entitled “Céline, USA.”  
One of the recurring themes is the pervasive Jewishness of Céline's American
 audience; the phenomenon is first remarked 
by
 Dickstein, who notes the influ ­
ence of Céline 
on
 Heller, Roth, and the sick comedians.
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